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The international legal community has failed to prevent
human rights violations with its traditional responses - ineffective
complaint procedures and noble proclamations of the human rights
of mankind.' Concerned response has generally manifested itself
in the form of studies, conventions, and declarations by interna-
tional organizations.2 A more realistic approach 3 to the develop-
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1. See G. DA FONSECA, HOW TO FILE COMPLAINTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
(1976) (text in Spanish) (this is one of the first publications to compile information and pro-
cedures on investigations of Human Rights violations by international organizations such as
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights). Da Fonseca realistically points out
that, in spite of the judicial appearance of complaint procedures, they are basically political
in nature. The most drastic action the Commission can take is to perform an investigation of
the complaint, and the investigation may only be done with the expressed consent of the
nation concerned. Id.
2. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc.
A/8 10, at 71 (1948); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); Declaration
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 2263, 22 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 35, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950); Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3,
70, reprinted in H. DEVRIES & J. RODRIGUEZ-NOVAS, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAS 222
(1965) [hereinafter cited as O.A.S. CHARTER].
3. See Introduction to I CASE STUDIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREE-
DOMS at xix (W. Veenhoven ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Veenhoven]. John Scali, former
United States Representative to the United Nations, compared human rights discussions in
the United Nations to discussions on other topics and found that "in no other area was the
contrast between what nations say and what they do so stark and so vivid [and] on no other
issue was the gap between the ideally desirable and practically attainable so frustratingly
wide." Id. A specific example of this lack of implementation of human rights declared in
the Charter is the continued existence of racial discrimination. In subscribing to the Charter,
all members pledged themselves to take joint and separate action for the achievement of
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ment of international protection for human rights may be to
ascertain general principles of law, recognized by all nations, that
protect human rights.
General principles of law recognized by all nations have tradi-
tionally been considered an important source of international law.4
Although general principles have often been referred to by interna-
tional tribunals,5 scholars have done little to define the scope and
content of such principles. This article attempts to define general
principles among those recognized by all nations, focusing on
human rights, where the variety of international claims and decla-
rations makes human rights law an area of extreme uncertainty.
Identifying general principles on which there is universal
agreement may help to settle this uncertain area of international
law. Because some countries incorporate international law into
their own legal systems, general principles of human rights recog-
nized by all nations, once identified, become applicable in local
courts as well as international tribunals.6 A codification of general
principles of human rights law recognized by all nations could es-
tablish a foundation upon which human rights law can further de-
velop.
This article searches for general principles of human rights law
by examining the municipal law of states. Dual state interests -
the collective responsibility of promoting human rights on an inter-
national level versus a state's interest in preserving its exclusive ju-
risdiction over local affairs - is discussed as an obstacle to the
international development of human rights. This article then ex-
amines and compares procedural municipal laws of several coun-
tries to discern common denominators that might be among those
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3. Yet,
racial discrimination is still widely practiced. It was pointed out at a meeting of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights that
[racial discrimination) exists everywhere in one form or another - and this applies
to North and South America, Europe (East and West), all of Africa and Asia. No
continent, country or people is free from some form of racial discrimination not
only of Whites against Blacks but Blacks against Whites, Whites against Whites,
and Blacks against Blacks.
Veenhoven, supra, at xviii.
4. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-30 (8th ed. 1955).
5. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [19691 I.C.J. 3, 42-43; Reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [195 1] I.C.J. 4,
10.
6. An excellent example of a municipal court's application of international law is West
Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391.
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general principles of human rights law recognized by all nations.
This article concludes by suggesting that this approach to ascertain-
ing general principles be employed in the future to further the de-
velopment and codification of international law.
I. SEARCHING FOR GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RECOGNIZED
BY ALL NATIONS
4. Municipal Law as a Source of General Principles
General principles of law recognized by all nations are an im-
portant source of international law.7 A high regard for general
principles of law was in evidence when the drafters of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) Statute included a provi-
sion calling for the Court to apply "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations."' Today, similar provisions are
found in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute.9 Yet, in-
ternational tribunals have invoked general principles of law infre-
quently. General principles of law have been viewed as a safety
valve to be applied by the courts only when no applicable interna-
tional convention or custom can be found.'° Courts are reluctant to
apply general principles of law, because the exact contents of such
principles have yet to be defined.I
Numerous writers have explored the sources of general princi-
ples of law and there has been considerable controversy among in-
ternational lawyers regarding the scope and exact meaning of such
7. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 29-30.
8. B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW at xiii (1953).
9. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter cited as ICJ STATUTE]. The inclusion of general princi-
ples of law as a source of law to be used by the Court constitutes an important landmark in
the history of international law. States, therefore, expressly recognize the existence of a
source of international law independent of treaties and custom. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at
29-30.
10. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT 165-67 (rev. ed. 1958).
11. See I G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (3d ed. 1957). For an ex-
ample of the confusion arising in the application of general principles, see generally Interpre-
tation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier Between Iraq and
Turkey), [1925] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 12. Before this opinion, the Court had repeatedly upheld
the principle that no one can be the judge in his own cause. LAUTERPACHT, .SUpra note 10, at
158-59. Yet, one of the principles embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations was
the overriding requirement of unanimity on decisions. Id. at 159. Accordingly, when a dis-
pute arose between Great Britain and Turkey, the Court had to decide whether it could vote
other than unanimously. Id. The Court, by reference to the principle that no one can be the
judge in his own cause, overrode the rigid provisions of Article 5 of the Covenant relating to
absolute unanimity. Id. at 159-60.
Vol. I0
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principles.' 2 Some writers consider general principles of law to re-
fer primarily to principles of international law founded upon cus-
tom and express agreements. 13 However, neither scholars nor the
drafters of the PCIJ Statute have suggested that municipal law, the
law of individual nations, is not a source of general principles of
law.'4 On the contrary, while some writers place emphasis on inter-
national law as a source of general principles of law, all studies
consider municipal law as one source of such principles.15 Further-
more, even scholars who emphasize international law and interna-
tional tribunal decisions as sources of general principles of law
conclude:
Since the essence of general principles of law is the fact of their
being common to all legal systems, it is . . .hoped . . .such
studies of international tribunal decisions .. .may also be of
interest to municipal and comparative lawyers who themselves
have much to contribute . . .[to the study of general principles
of law].
16
It therefore "remains for comparative lawyers to elaborate the exact
contents of such general principles of law."' 7
12. CHENG, supra note 8, at 2.
13. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, at 96. A contrary argument can be made by scrutinizing
the ICJ Statute. Because other sections of the ICJ Statute call for the application of interna-
tional law found in conventions and custom, it would be redundant to interpret the general
principles of law section as the same law. CHENG, supra note 8, at 2-3. Therefore, these
proponents claim that the general principles of law provision can only be meant to refer to
principles found in municipal law. H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALO-
GIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1927). According to their view, general principles of law
"are for the most practical purposes identical with general principles of private law." Id.
14. See CHENG, supra note 8, at 1-26.
15. Id.
16. Id. at xv.
17. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 11, at 43. "The comparative method of studying
the legal systems of different nations is no doubt a valuable and even conclusive test [of]
whether a given principle represents a general truth ...." CHENG, supra note 8, at 392.
Comparative law in this area is valuable in the interpretation of multinational agreements by
aiding in construing terms such as "misuse of power" as grounds for the annulment of ad-
ministrative acts. This term is found in Article 3 of the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 141; Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome, entered intoforce
Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; and Article 146 of the Euratom (European Atomic Energy
Community) Treaty, done Apr. 17, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. In arriving at the proper mean-
ing of this term, the Court of Justice for the European Economic Community has based its
holdings on comparative law discussions of the Advocate General, and has searched for a
common principle in the laws of the individual members of the Community. Id. Similarly,
comparative law methods can be used to find the exact content of general principles of law
by ascertaining the common core of principles recognized by all nations.
"The Advocates General have frequently submitted that the [Euratom] Treaty can be
taken in particular fields to have borrowed or adopted concepts developed in the legal sys-
tems of Member States." I A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW 530 (1969). Where a
4
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Municipal law should be included as a source of general prin-
ciples of law, because "[i]nternational law has recruited and contin-
ues to recruit many of its rules and institutions from private systems
of law."' 8 Yet, if international law borrowed from municipal laws
"lock, stock and barrel," it would be difficult to envision any appli-
cation of general principles of law.19 It is therefore more reason-
able to regard "the rules and institutions of private law as an
indication of policy and principles rather than. . . directly import-
ing these rules and institutions."2
The notion of general principles of law as those laws common
to all municipal systems is supported by a comparison of the appli-
cation of custom and general principles of law under the ICJ Stat-
ute. Article 38 provides in part for the following:
1. The Court whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it shall
apply...
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as la,,
(c) the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.2'
The ICJ Statute requires the Court to apply "custom," meaning a
general practice among states accepted by them as law. Accord-
ingly, a general practice among states, as well as the recognition of
the legal character of such practice, is required for customary law to
be applicable.22
In contrast, application of general principles of law does not
require any such general practice among states. Rather, this source
of international law consists of "general principles of that social
phenomenon common to all civilized societies which is called
law."' 23 One drafter of the ICJ Statute summarized general princi-
ples of law by stating that "general principles of law [are] the basis
treaty contains no solution in regard to a particular point, "the Court, to avoid being guilty of
a denial of justice, is thus obliged to resolve the problem [using] rules recognized by the
legislation and jurisprudence of Member States." Id. at 530 (quoting Algeria and Others v.
Common Assembly, 3 RECUEIL 114-15 (1957)).
18. SCHWARZENBERGER, stupra note 11, at 46.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. ICJ STATUTE art. 38, para. 1.
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of the municipal law of all or nearly all states."2 4
This interpretation of general principles of law suggests that
among legal systems there exists a common denominator of princi-
ples that are necessary for the existence of any municipal system.
This approach to general principles of law is a basis upon which to
begin a search for general principles of law among municipal sys-
tems that might be said to be recognized by all nations.
II. AN OBSTACLE TO ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS:
DUAL STATE INTERESTS
International concern for human rights must confront the
problem of dual state interests. 25 Human rights must be given col-
lective recognition by states, because such recognition is essential to
the existence and protection of rights promoting human dignity.
Simultaneously, individual state interests demand exclusive control
over predominantly local affairs.26 Unfortunately, such control can
affect human rights development internationally. In addition,
"how a nation-state controls its people . . . and organizes its...
[institutions] may well affect the general practices of other nation-
states and their willingness or unwillingness to engage in particular
measures of cooperation" for the promotion of human rights.
27
McDougal summarizes state perspectives in regard to human
rights and international law by stating:
The most general interest of all states and peoples, adhering to
the values of human dignity, is. . . a world public order which
achieves that balance between the inclusive competence of the
general community of states and the exclusive competence of
particular states which best promotes the greatest total produc-
tion, at least cost, of their shared values.
28
The advancement of human rights brings into opposition compet-
ing state interests. States recognize that in today's world of interde-
pendence, the responsibility for promoting human dignity must be
collectively shared on an international level. Simultaneously, there
is a state's interest in protecting its exclusive jurisdiction over
predominantly local affairs. These two interests have qualities that
contradict each other. One demands subordinating sovereign inter-
ests to promote the international protection of human rights; the
24. Id. at 25.
25. See M. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 157-59 (1960).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 159.
28. Id. at 159.
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other calls for exclusive national jurisdiction over local matters.
General principles of law in the area of human rights must, there-
fore, satisfy both interests if they are to be universally accepted.
In examining these contradictory state interests, it is apparent
that in order to promote human rights, national interests must give
way to collective responsibility. It has become clear that
no nation can any longer cope unaided with the probabilities
and possibilities, as well as with the certainties, of modem exist-
ence. Yet the state invariably claims its own interests to be the
center of its moral universe.
...[A]s long as the assertion of the interests of the national
community is regarded as the highest good, nationalism will re-
main an armed doctrine and national sovereignty an aggressive
force.29
Consequently, the concept of shared responsibility for promoting
human rights must be considered to be of national interest.3"
A state's claim of exclusive jurisdiction over local transactions
presents a formidable obstacle to the international development of
human rights. An individual's mere presence within a state may be
deemed sufficient grounds for characterizing his treatment as a
local matter, leaving the application of any human rights to indi-
vidual state discretion.
Under these circumstances, prospects for international human
rights development appear grim. McDougal, however, combines
the dual state interest concept with his description of international
law and suggests a solution to this dilemma. He describes interna-
tional law as a body of flexible prescriptions related to community
policies.3 ' Under his theory, international law is a system that is
sufficiently flexible to include individual community policies.32
Furthermore, McDougal suggests that agreement on common val-
ues in the international community can be attained by a "creative
balance" between dual state interests.33
29. M. MOSKOWITz, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (1968).
30. McDOUGAL, supra note 25, at 159.
31. Id. at 170.
32. Id.
33. Id. The view of international law as a flexible body of policies has been held by
many legal scholars. Professor Hoffmann states: "A vigorous discussion is taking place,
among international lawyers and political scientists, about the proper place and possibilities
of international law." Hoffmann, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELE-
VANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 34 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1971). "[W]e must
look at international law from the viewpoint of the policy makers: where and when does the
respect and application of rules fit in their constellation of policies?" Id. at 36. Scholars of
international law agree that there is a need to develop "tools and concepts to study and
Vol. 10
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Applying his suggestion to the international development of
human rights, this creative balance will satisfy both state interests.
A first step toward the international recognition of human rights is
to distinguish procedural from substantive rights. Under this ap-
proach, universal recognition of procedural rights is sought first,
leaving substantive rights to the discretion of individual state law.
Thus, a creative balance can be attained and both state interests can
be upheld. There would be shared responsibility in promoting
human rights by the international recognition of basic procedural
rights, but there would also be the recognition of a state's exclusive
jurisdiction to apply its substantive laws within its borders. Be-
cause recognition of universal procedural principles would not un-
duly interfere with other state interests, they are a realistic starting
point in the development of international human rights.
III. PROCEDURAL MUNICIPAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF GENERAL
PRINCIPLES IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
In examining the municipal law of states in search of common
denominators, it is necessary to ascertain the laws that are essential
in any legal system for the development of human rights. If such
laws can be identified, then legal systems recognizing any human
rights must at a minimum recognize these prerequisite laws. Be-
cause all nations claim to recognize some human rights (despite the
lack of agreement on the specific rights recognized), logically all
nations must recognize the laws prerequisite to the existence of any
human rights. A search for common denominators in state munici-
pal law should therefore attempt to find and identify the prerequi-
site laws necessary for the existence and development of human
rights.
Historically, the starting point on the path toward human
rights development has been the existence of a single background
condition - a secure and procedurally regularized legal system.34
explain the dynamic aspects of [the international] legal process." Introduction to I THE Fu-
TURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: TRENDS AND PATTERNS AT iX-X (C. Black &
R. Falk eds. 1969).
34. Claude, The Classical Model of Human Rights Development, in COMPARATIVE
HUMAN RIGHTS 6, 7 (R. Claude ed. 1976). One view of human rights is that they exist as a
matter of convention. See generally Edel, Some Refections on the Concept of Human Rights,
in HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1 (E. Pollack ed. 1971). John Locke describes freedom in terms of the
safety and security found in a civil society, which offers procedural safeguards against the
actions of those who step outside the bounds of civilized behavior. See Locke, The Second
Treatise of Civil Government, in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM, Pt. II, at 1, 23-27 (M. Mayer
ed. 1957). Such procedural safeguards establish a sphere of special protection for individual
8
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There is nothing idealistic about this requirement; it merely calls
for an operative legal system that securely establishes some funda-
mental rights which are recognized by society. The existence of
human rights requires two major developments - agreement be-
tween members of society on the rights to be enforced and a system
of enforcement.35 Where the government enforces human rights,
"the strength of the state can alone secure the liberty of its mem-
bers."36 This freedom, political freedom, can be defined as the
"condition of not being subject to the inconsistent, uncertain, un-
known, arbitrary will of another. . . ." This freedom is depen-
dent upon establishing limits to the domination of an individual by
his government.38
Scholars emphasize that without regularized procedures, the
individual is subject to the uncertain and arbitrary will of an-
other;39 under such circumstances, no human rights can exist.
However, once regularized legal procedures exist, limitations are
placed on the domination of others, and the fundamental human
right - freedom from arbitrary treatment - is born.
Regularized legal procedures have long been recognized as an
important prerequisite to the existence and development of human
rights.4' Any municipal system purporting to recognize human
rights. "Very prominent in the modern tradition of rights is the notion that rights should
protect . . . freedom from excessive interference on the part of the state." R. FLATHMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS 154 (1976).
35. The system of enforcement of rights has been characterized as coercion; however,
here the term coercion is used as "an expression of liberty." Cervera, Natural Law Restated:
An Analysis ofLibery, in HUMAN RIGHTS 55, 60-61 (E. Pollack ed. 1971).
36. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 52 (G. Cole trans. 1950).
37. Claude, supra note 34, at 10.
38. Id.
39. Charles de Secondat claims that liberty is a condition where there is no abuse of
power by government:
To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power
should be a check to power. A government [should] be constituted [so that] no man
shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor force to
abstain from that which the law permits.
C. de Secondat & C. de Montesquieu, The Spiri o/Laws, in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM,
pt. I, at I, 81 (M. Mayer ed. 1957).
40. This connection between procedural rules and human rights was emphasized by
Max Weber, who stated that procedural rules of law are fundamental to human rights devel-
opment. He stated that the demands for such basic human rights as " 'legal equality' and
. . . guaranties against arbitrariness require formal rational objectivity in [the] administra-
tion [ofjustice] in contrast to personal free choice. M. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW
AND ECONOMY 355 (1954).
Professor Colliva of Bologna, in an historical study of the late medieval constitutions of
Bologna in search of antecedents of modern human rights, emphasizes the importance of
procedurally regularized legal institutions to the development of human rights. Colliva, Die
Vol. 10
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rights must, therefore, also recognize certain regularized legal pro-
cedures necessary for their existence. Because all nations purport
to recognize some human rights, recognition of the prerequisite
procedural rules must be universal. Following this logic, regular-
ized procedural rules common to all municipal systems are a fruit-
ful source of general principles of law recognized by all nations.
Comparative law scholars have encountered difficulty in com-
paring these procedural rules and their historical development.4 '
Although certain procedural laws are a prerequisite for human
rights development, the development and form of these procedures
vary greatly and are often difficult to compare. Ironically, begin-
ning human rights development by placing procedural limits on
governmental domination of the individual marks the discovery of
procedural differences between legal systems.42 If agreement on
procedural rules exists at all, it must be found in the prerequisite
Rechtss'aailichheit im Mittelalter, INTERNATIONALES COLLOQUIUM UBER MENSCHENRECHT
ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 1-20 (W. Bruxenstein ed. 1968). Colliva under-
scores the importance of the development of regularized and rationalized legal procedures
under Italian free-community constitutions; such procedures set the stage for the develop-
ment of publicly defined legal rights. Id.
41. See G. MUELLER & F. LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 3-6 (1969). The substance and procedures of the rule of law will always be concerned
with relations between authority and the individual. H. EHRMANN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL
CULTURES 49 (1976).
The question of where conflicts between public authorities and individuals should
be decided has long divided Anglo-American and civil law systems. In the former,
the view has been that the equality of all before the law and thereby the rule of law
itself would be violated if suits involving government and administration were not
tried in the "common" courts. On the European continent and in Latin America a
more or less elaborate hierarchy of administrative tribunals has been developed to
decide this kind of controversy.
Id.
42. An example of this divergence in procedural development is clearly shown in a
comparison of human rights development in the administration of criminal justice in the
Anglo-Saxon and Continental systems. An analysis of these systems approximately 760
years ago would have shown the two systems to be identical. For several centuries, until
1215, the nature and conduct of criminal proceedings was actually indistinguishable on the
European continent and in England.
The predominant mode of accusation was private, and trial was by ordeal during
church ceremonies. Superstition and arbitrary wills of sovereigns reigned virtually
supreme until 1215 when the nobles forced King John to sign the Magna Charta,
the document which. laid down the basis for a system of rational guilt determi-
nations.
MUELLER & LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, supra note 41, at 3-4.
The new system, prohibiting clergy from officiating at trial by ordeal, sparked new de-
velopments in guilt determinations: "The English . . . were forced to seek alternate . . .
more rational modes of determining guilt or innocence of suspected persons. But the choice
of [the] English. . . and the Continentals. . . was to be rather different, ultimately making
for a radically different position of the defendant in the criminal process." Id. at 4.
1980
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rules necessary for the development of human rights - rules
preventing arbitrary decision within the legal system. The histori-
cal development of these prerequisite rules has been anything but
uniform, which has led to the adoption of widely differing proce-
dures by the various legal systems.
While acknowledging the diverse development of these proce-
dures, it remains possible to find procedural principles that are uni-
versally recognized - namely, thepurpose of such procedural laws.
The fundamental purpose of these procedural rules is to protect the
individual from arbitrary domination by placing limits on the ac-
tivities of governing bodies. In other words, it is not a specific
description of the limits themselves that is important, but the fact
that their existence accomplishes the same result - protecting the
individual from arbitrary domination. Under this approach, such
procedures, although different in detail, agree in principle. Accord-
ingly, among these procedures there must exist general principles of
law upon which all nations agree.
IV. DIFFICULTIES IN COMPARING MUNICIPAL LAW
Determining general principles of law by examining various
national laws, even when limited to basic procedural principles, is a
difficult undertaking. If the comparisons are to be relevant and
useful, both doctrine and practice must be compared.43 An exam-
ple of the need to compare both doctrine and practice is found "in
countries that came under the sway of Confucian thought, such as
traditional China and Japan, [where] ritual and not law was the
foundation of the social order. Neither lawmaking nor the judicial
process was looked upon as the normal means of maintaining or
restoring harmony among these societies."" An examination of
only the lawmaking process in such systems would be meaningless.
Comparative law scholars emphasize that
[m]ere formal collocation of the laws to be compared is not ade-
quate; account must be taken of the interpretive doctrines and
their illuminating applications by the courts... as well as of the
differing structures of ideas, the historical background, and the
specific . . . practical aspects relating to each question.45
Another problem with comparative analysis is the dearth of
43. Hug & Ireland, The Progress of Comparative Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 68, 73 (1931).
44. EHRMANN, supra note 41, at 18.
45. Yntema, Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan, 43 MICH. L.
REV. 549, 557 (1944).
282 Vol. 10
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reliable information in such developing areas of law as human
rights.46 Narrowing the scope of the investigation to the study of
specific procedural rules diminishes this problem, because these
rules are often found in provisions of procedural codes and statutes.
However, the student of comparative law is still faced with the
problem of interpreting these provisions in their unfamiliar legal
system context.
Because of these difficulties, the search, in this article, for gen-
eral principles of law found in municipal law is limited to the use of
three reasonably reliable sources. The first two sources are compi-
lations of statements made by individual countries regarding the
laws and practices of their respective legal systems. These declara-
tions were made in response to a United Nations solicitation of
world opinion on specific topics.
47
When no first-hand information is available, national constitu-
tions provide a third source of information. This source is impor-
tant because of its availability; translations of all national
constitutions are available in English. However, because examin-
ing constitutions could lead to errors in the interpretation of munic-
ipal laws and their practice in unfamiliar systems, areas of possible
uncertainty will be so indicated.
V. USE OF UNITED NATIONS STUDIES AS A PRIMARY SOURCE
OF RESEARCH MATERIAL
As discussed above, the search for general principles of law
has focused on the procedural rights considered prerequisite to the
further development of other human rights. Studies by the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights support the premise that
certain prerequisite rules exist.48 In particular, the Commission has
focused on an important right crucial to the advancement of other
human rights - the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion.49 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Com-
mission both recognize that this right must exist before other
46. See Claude, supra note 34, at 72.
47. The statements proved useful, because they eliminated some of the dangers of erro-
neous interpretation of municipal laws - representatives of the countries explained how
various procedures were implemented under their respective systems. The statements were
valuable in examining various municipal systems in search of common principles. See notes
58 & 123 infra.
48. See generally Study of the Right to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and
Exile, 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8), U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/ Rev. 1 (1964).
49. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 9.
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human rights can be developed.5 ° The Declaration gives interna-
tional recognition to human rights during criminal proceedings by
proclaiming that everyone has the right to "liberty and security of
person."'" More specifically, the Declaration safeguards this right
by providing that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, de-
tention, or exile."52 The Commission has stressed the crucial im-
portance of this safeguard, because most of the remaining rights
enumerated in the Declaration cannot be enjoyed or exercised if a
person is not "free."53
The right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention pro-
vides an answer to the paradox arising from attempts to implement
the important principle that "[e]veryone charged with a penal of-
fense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty ac-
cording to law. . . ."" The paradox arises in presuming a person
innocent, yet holding him in prison before his guilt has been estab-
lished. If the arrest and detention are in accordance with specific
provisions of law, the presumption of innocence is given more ef-
fect. The key to implementing the presumption of innocence and
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest is the requirement that the
suspect be held only in accordance with legal procedures. Accord-
ingly, the Commission chose as its first subject for study the right to
be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.55
The Commission thoroughly examined the various arrest and
detention procedures reported to them by countries participating in
the study and produced a report of the procedural similarities and
differences between legal systems. Finally, the Commission pre-
pared "Draft Articles" on the right to be free from arbitrary arrest
and detention. The Commission's goal was to have the Draft Arti-
cles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as proce-
50. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 10, 1948, by a vote of 48 to zero. Id. Although there were
no dissenting votes, the following states abstained: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian S.S.R., the Soviet Union, the Union of South Africa, and
Yugoslavia.
51. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 3.
52. Id. art. 9.
53. The Commission has pointed out that arbitrary arrest impairs the specific rights in
Articles 12, 13, and 16 of the Declaration. Arrest and detention destroy privacy, curtail free-
dom of movement, require separation of family, and deny the opportunity to enjoy the politi-
cal and economic rights promulgated by the Declaration. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/Rev. 1, at
208 (1964).
54. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 11.
55. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/Rev. 1, at 1-5 (1964).
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dures to which all law and practice should conform.56 The Draft
Articles were a compilation of selected laws from various countries,
which rendered the fullest protection of the right to liberty and se-
curity of person in regard to arrest and detention. The Draft Arti-
cles represent the highest standards for individual protection as
determined by the Commission; they represent those standards to
which laws and practice should conform.
At its eighteenth session, the Commission decided to transmit
the Draft Articles to members of the United Nations and to request
those states to submit comments on them.57 The comments re-
ceived were individual state assessments of the Draft Articles vis-4-
vis each state's own existing legal system. The comments indicate
similarities between the Draft Articles and existing municipal law
and point out municipal variations from the Draft Articles, whether
on minor details or on fundamental concepts.58
Forty-eight governments submitted comments to the Draft Ar-
ticles.59 These countries, representing a wide diversity of legal sys-
56. The first step taken by the Commission was the preparation of a summary on the
arrest and detention laws of as many countries as possible. Id. at 4-5. These summaries were
then sent to their respective countries for comments and corrections so that the final summa-
ries provided an accurate basis for the Commission's study. Id. at 5. Accordingly, the atten-
tion given to the preparation of these summaries was crucial in achieving a true description
of each country's criminal system with regard to arrest and detention.
During the preparation of summaries, the Commission at no time attempted to attribute
principles to a legal system in contradiction to its existing law. Rather, the summary prepa-
ration period was strictly an information-gathering service upon which the Commission
could later base its report. Id.
From the 91 summaries prepared and the comments furnished by various countries, the
Commission was able to study a wide variety of criminal procedures used by diverse systems.
See id. at 218-19. The draft principles were framed from a comparison of the legal proce-
dures used to enforce the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention. The Commis-
sion patterned the draft principles after the procedures they felt best protected an individual
from arbitrary arrest and detention.
57. Id. at 205.
58. A statement typical of the kind received by the Commission was that of El Salvador.
See Comments of Governments on the Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, and Draft Principles on the Freedom from Arbitrary
Arrest and Detention, 35-36 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8), U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835 (1963).
El Salvador stated: "Most of the ... draft principles are already laid down in our Political
Constitution and in ordinary legislation. Reference is made below to the [draft] articles
which contain these principles and to those of the draft principles which would involve
amendments to our legislation." U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 9, at 1 (1964). El Salvador
then discusses each draft principle, indicating where that principle is found under the law of
El Salvador, or where the law of El Salvador would need to be amended to comply with a
principle. See id. at 1-10.
59. See generally U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/1963; U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Adds. 1-1l
(1963-1966). The following countries submitted comments on the draft principles:
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tems, were in surprising agreement with the Draft Articles.6"
VI. DEVELOPING PRINCIPLES
A. Development and Recognition of the First Summarized
Princle
A careful examination of the comments to the Draft Articles
indicates that certain provisions of the Draft Articles can be sum-
marized into principles upon which all commenting countries can
agree. In summarizing these provisions, the comments of each
country were consulted. Where disagreement was expressed, the
Draft Articles were either modified pursuant to suggestions found
in the comments, or the objectionable articles were omitted. The
summaries are meant to include only those principles of the Draft
Articles which are totally acceptable to the countries submitting
comments.
Summarization of the Draft Articles indicates total agreement
on several "summarized principles," the first of which is the follow-
ing:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or deten-
tion. Arrest or detention is arbitrary if it is on grounds or in
accordance with procedures other than those established by law.
The terms "arrest" and "detention" shall be defined by law.
This first summarized principle describes the basic right to be
free from arbitrary arrest and detention. It was derived from Arti-
cle I(a) of the Draft Articles, which states: "No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary arrest or detention. Arrest or detention is
arbitrary if it is . . .on grounds or in accordance with procedures
other than those established by law . ",61
All of the forty-eight countries submitting comments agreed in
principle with this statement; many countries indicated that Article
I(a) duplicated their municipal laws.62 Additionally, many coun-
Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Czechoslovakia, San Marino,
Spain, Ukrainian S.S.R., the United Arab Republic, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Den-
mark, Morocco, Poland, Finland, India, Japan, Mexico, the United States, the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Brazil, Byelorussia,
Chad, Cyprus, Ivory Coast, Norway, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sweden, Turkey, El Salvador,
Malaysia, Switzerland, Ireland, Romania, and Jamaica. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 9, at
1 (1964).
60. For further indication of this agreement, see appendix, tables I & II, infra.
61. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/Rev. 1, at 205 (1964).
62. France stated that the principle was in exact agreement with its constitution;
Mexico, Brazil, Chad, El Salvador, and Romania indicated agreement between their consti-
tutional provisions and Article I(a). U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 27 (1963) (France); U.N.
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tries mentioned that Article l(a) was in agreement with their penal
and procedural codes.63 Argentina, Iran, Mauritania, and Sierra
Leone unequivocally accepted all of the Draft Articles, including
Article I(a). 4
No country submitting comments on the Draft Articles dis-
agreed with the basic principle that an individual has the right to be
free from arbitrary arrest and detention, nor with the definition of
arbitrary as stated in Article I(a). In fact, many countries were in
agreement with an even stronger version of this right. Iraq, in ref-
erence to its laws and constitution, stated that it "not only observed
the fundamental principles embodied in the Draft but ...had
gone further by considering the violation of [these] Individual Free-
doms a crime punishable with a criminal penalty.' ' 65 Morocco also
supported a stronger version of the right and cited provisions of the
Moroccan penal code as evidence of its support.66
The agreement upon Article l(a) deserves emphasis, because
other Draft Articles were not as widely accepted. 67 Examination of
comments in opposition to various Draft provisions indicates that
countries emphatically articulated any disagreement between the
Draft Articles and their state law or practice and described in depth
their reasons for disapproval. 68 Most comments began with a sup-
porting statement of Article I(a) and its principles. 9 Countries
Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 2, at 14 (1963) (Mexico); U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 8, at 1-2
(1963) (Brazil); id. at 8 (Chad); U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 9, at 2 (1964) (El Salvador);
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 10, at 7 (1964) (Romania).
63. Morocco, for example, stated that these principles are all found in the Moroccan
penal code. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 1, at 15 (1963).
64. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 2 (1963) (Argentina); id. at 39 (Iran); id. at 48 (Maurita-
nia); U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 8, at 25 (1963) (Sierra Leone).
65. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 40 (1963) (Iraq).
66. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 10, at 15 (1964) (Morocco).
67. For example, the Austrian Federal Government suggested "that the provision con-
cerning review of detention at any time upon the request of the detainee should be omitted
since, in any case, the detention is to be reviewed ex officio at short intervals to be specified
by law." U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 6 (1963) (Austria). Canada also criticized this particu-
lar Draft Article, indicating that although habeas corpus procedures would be available to a
detainee, detention would not always be reviewed at regular intervals. Id. at 20 (Canada).
France, in criticizing Article 33, stated that exceptions should be made in regard to detention
of persons of unsound mind; in an emergency, an insane person must be hospitalized without
delay. Id. at 32 (France).
68. Id.
69. Countries that criticized certain Draft Articles spoke of the general principles of the
Draft favorably. The Austrian Federal Government described the Draft as constituting "a
further step towards the strengthening of the fundamental rights of the individual the vital
importance of which is recognized in modern international law." Id. at 3. Canada stated:
"In broad terms the law of Canada is in accordance with this principle [Article I]." Id. at 8.
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then commented in detail on other provisions found in the Draft
Articles. Some countries addressed only those articles which dis-
agreed with their existing laws; other countries commented on all
Draft Articles.
Most disagreement was based not upon specific conflicts be-
tween state law and the provisions of the Draft Articles, but upon
the detail of the Articles. 70 Japan's comment aptly summarizes this
common criticism:
It is very significant for the protection of fundamental human
rights. . . that the United Nations intends to establish standard
principles to which law and practice should conform. . . . How-
ever, it must be pointed out that in every country the procedures
concerning criminal trials . . . originate from its history, na-
tional and social requirements and people's legal feelings, and
are inseparably connected with the provisions of the constitution,
penal code and other relevant laws. . . and functions of. . . the
court [and] the police. . . . Therefore, it is deemed advisable
that the said standard principles should not go so far as to set
forth detail and concrete restrictions or regulations in connection
with the system and procedures of arrest and detention. 7'
The above criticism, voiced by many countries, suggests that the
detailed regulation of the Draft Articles be deleted, but that itsprin-
coles be kept.72
Japan's comment addresses the problems that arise when at-
tempts are made to establish international procedural standards
when there exist vast differences among legal systems.73 These pro-
France commented: "[Tihe broad principles underlying this text coincide with those on
which the recent French Code of Criminal Procedure is based." Id. at 27 (France).
70. For example, Draft Article 26 requires: "The arrested person shall not be kept in
police custody after he is brought before a competent [judicial] authority . . . [and] officials
responsible for his custody shall be independent of the authorities conducting the investiga-
tion." U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/Rev. 1, at 212 (1964).
Malaysia found the whole article unacceptable and suggested total deletion. Israel
stated that the article would require "alterations [in its existing system] and expenses which
go far beyond what the state of Israel is at present able to undertake." U.N. Doc. E/CN.
4/835/Add. 9, at 14 (1964) (Malaysia); U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 7, at 6 (1963) (Israel).
Canada also found the principle unacceptable and stated that "in outlying parts of
northern Canada where such place of custody is unavailable, the arrested person may be
kept in detachment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police . . . [under the Canadian sys-
tem]." U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 18 (1963) (Canada).
71. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 2, at 11 (1963) (Japan).
72. Support for the fundamental principles of the Draft was found in the comments of
many countries. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 26 (1963) (Dominican Republic); id.
at 40 (Iraq); id. at 46-47 (Luxembourg); id. at 48 (Mauritania); id. at 71 (United Kingdom).
73. Other countries noted the difficulties in comparing procedures. Austria argued that
some provisions of the Draft Articles ignore the special features of the legal system in force
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cedural differences are the result of divergent cultural and social
values, as well as unique historical development. Considering the
vast differences among legal systems and the basis for their differ-
ences, general agreement upon procedural rules would appear to be
unattainable.
Japan provides a solution to this dilemma, suggesting that in-
ternational standards be developed as principles, rather than as de-
tailed regulations.74 A variety of procedures offer - in principle -
the same protection of human rights; therefore, agreement among
nations can be reached on the "principles" that will protect human
rights, leaving to state discretion the choice of "procedure." 75
A summarization of the detailed regulations of the Draft Arti-
cles can define principles which, in turn, can serve as guidelines for
the establishment of procedures in the various legal systems. This
method of summarizing Draft Articles was suggested by some of
the countries objecting to the detailed regulation of the Draft Arti-
cles.76
B. Development and Recognition of the Second and Third
Summarized Princoles
An initial summarization of Draft Article 38 reads:
Anyone who is arrested or detained shall be entitled to initi-
ate proceedings before an authority in order to challenge the le-
gality of his arrest or detention and obtain his release from that
authority without delay if it is unlawful.
on the continent, particularly the institution of the examining judge (Utersuchungsrichter).
Id. at 4 (Austria). Romania stated that its procedure for safeguarding arbitrary arrest and
detention is in the form of the procurator's office, a feature not specifically considered by the
Draft Articles. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 10, at 16 (1964) (Romania).
74. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 2, at 11 (1963).
75. See id. Austria and Romania describe different procedures which, they state, fully
guarantee the right of an individual to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention. U.N.
Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 3-6 (1963) (Austria); U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 10, at 7-11 (1964)
(Romania).
76. An example of this summarizing method was suggested by Romania in its com-
ments regarding Article 13 which requires that a detention order contain specific details.
Romania, in sharing Japan's criticism of detail, suggested that this article be revised as fol-
lows: "The written order authorizing the detention must contain all the particulars necessary
for the detained person to be adequately informed of the reasons for the measure. The law
shall specify the requisite particulars." U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 10, at 16 (1964)
(Romania).
Following this example, the article would still express the principle requiring a deten-
tion order to adequately inform the detainee of the ground of his detention; yet, the specific
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The authority before which the proceedings take place shall
be an impartial authority independent of the prosecution and po-
lice.77
These provisions were widely accepted by the countries sub-
mitting comments to the Draft Articles. Some countries expressed
a willingness to accept the specific procedures of Article 38 even
though such precise procedures were not found in their state laws.7 8
Sweden suggested adoption of Article 38 procedures by coun-
tries lacking such laws or similar practices. Sweden stated that its
objection to the details of the Article that conflicted with Swedish
law did not imply "that the Swedish government is blind to the fact
that the . . . [Draft Articles], if practiced in places lacking tradi-
tions of. . . [this kind], would serve as a valuable protection of the
right of the individual. .. .
Some countries objected to the detailed provisions of Article
38, but supported its principles. 80 England complained that Article
38 was too detailed and proposed that it "be limited to a require-
77. This summary was derived from Draft Article 38 which declares similar rights in the
following manner:
I. Anyone who is arrested or detained contrary to the provisions set forth in
the foregoing articles or is in imminent danger thereof or who is denied any of the
basic rights and guarantees set forth in these Articles shall be entitled to take pro-
ceedings immediately before a judicial authority in order to challenge the legality
of his arrest or detention and obtain his release without delay if it is unlawful or to
prevent the threatened injury or enforcement of his rights.
2. The proceedings before such authority shall be simple, expeditious and
free of charge. The aggrieved party, if in custody, must be produced without delay
by the official or other person detaining him before a judicial authority before
which recourse is taken. The onus shall be upon the detaining official or other
person to establish affirmatively the legality of his act.
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/Rev. 1, at 216 (1964).
78. For example, Ivory Coast stated that it "has no equivalent to these procedures in
such concise form. However, if a number of scattered texts are taken in conjunction . . . it
may be said that the provisions of Article 38 . . . of the draft are also found in Ivory Coast
law." U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 8, at 11-12 (1963).
79. Id. at 28.
80. See appendix, table 2, infra. Countries that objected to the detail of the Draft Arti-
cles are designated by "E." This code is used to indicate the countries that stated specific
disagreement with the article relevant to the summarized principles. In such cases, the sum-
marized principles modified the article so it could be acceptable to the objecting country.
For example, various countries disagreed with that part of Article 38 calling for the use
of the remedy by persons "in imminent danger" of arbitrary arrest or detention. France felt
that "in practice it may be difficult to take the proposed measures in favor of persons 'in
imminent danger' of arrest." U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 33 (1963) (France).
Spain indicated the reasons behind this objection:
There is no objection to . . . [Article 38], except that it is unreasonable to enti-
tle a person who has not been arrested but is 'in imminent danger' of arrest to take
proceedings before a judicial authority in order to challenge the legality of his ar-
rest. What conclusive evidence can be advanced to demonstrate objectively that the
danger of illegal arrest is "imminent"? It is practically impossible to furnish it.
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ment that there . . be a procedure available under which an ar-
rested or detained person has a means of challenging the legality of
his detention."' This suggestion embodies the principle of Article
38 - to provide a detained person with a remedy to challenge the
legality of his arrest or detention.82 This fundamental principle,
found in the first section of Article 38, lacks the objectionable detail
found in other sections.8 3 Comments criticizing Article 38 were di-
rected at sections other than section one.
84
In developing summarized principles from Article 38 upon
which all nations might agree, it is necessary to delete sections call-
ing for detailed procedures. Deleting the detail expands the scope
of the principle to include additional procedures that accomplish
the same purpose and make the article more acceptable to countries
employing these other procedures. The result is a clearer under-
standing of generally agreed upon principles; objectional, distract-
ing details are deleted.
The validity of this approach was tested by reexamining the
countries' comments on the first section of Article 38. Not surpris-
ingly, forty-two of the forty-eight countries submitting comments
either specifically agreed with Article 38(1) or at least did not spe-
Logically there can be recourse against unjust action only a posteriore, after the
action appealed against has been carried out.
Id. at 61 (Spain).
Omitting the provision regarding those "in imminent danger," would eliminate the ob-
jection to Article 38 based on this provision. Accordingly, the summarized principles, seek-
ing universal acceptance, have omitted this provision regarding those "in imminent danger."
81. Id. at 79 (United Kingdom).
82. In summarizing Article 38 to omit objectionable details, England's suggestion was
used as a statement of the Article's principle.
83. In accordance with England's suggestion, the first section merely calls for proceed-
ings before a judicial authority to challenge the legality of an arrest or detention. Predict-
ably, many of the countries objecting to the details of the other sections of Article 38 agreed
with this section. Specific agreement between Article 38(1) and state constitutions was men-
tioned by Canada, Brazil, El Salvador, and Jamaica. Id. at 22 (Canada); U.N. Doc. E/CN.
4/835/Add. 8, at 4 (1963) (Brazil); U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 9, at 9-10 (1964) (El Salva-
dor).
84. Yugoslavia and the Netherlands objected to the procedural details of Article 38,
because, in their opinion, the right of appeal offered to a detained person under their laws is
very effective and offers adequate safeguards. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 4, at 5 (1963)
(Yugoslavia). The Netherlands stated that, under such procedures, the arrested person is
given every opportunity to lodge an appeal questioning his detention and that a judicial
authority would then rule on that appeal. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 5, at 5-6 (1963) (the
Netherlands).
Although the procedure of regular appeal differs somewhat from the specific procedures
required by the other sections of Article 38, it agrees with the first section of the article. Both
the procedure of regular appeal and the first section of Article 38 grant the detained person
the right to challenge the legality of his detention before a judicial authority.
20
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cifically object to it. 85 Many of the countries supporting Article
38(1) pointed to provisions in their own laws allowing for judicial
procedure to challenge the legality of detention.86
There was, however, further criticism of that part of Article
38(1) calling for judicial proceedings to challenge the legality of ar-
rest or detention. Poland, Finland, Byelorussia, and Romania ob-
jected to this provision, because their laws provide for various
"administrative" proceedings to deal with a detainee's complaint.8 7
Due to this criticism, any summarized principle derived from
Article 38 must include these procedures. It is possible, however,
that modifications to include administrative procedures may make
the article an ineffective safeguard of the rights of the detainee.
Principles of human rights must embrace "specific" rights if they
are to be a meaningful contribution to human rights development.
Broad generalizations that merely summarize common denomina-
tors of municipal laws might lack the specificity necessary to iden-
tify human rights violations. Broad general statements would then
be no more effective in advancing human rights than the numerous
existing international declarations which have had no effect on
state practice.88 Accordingly, the real question presented is whether
the judicial nature of the authority described in Article 38(1) is es-
sential to the detainee's right to challenge his detention.
The rationale behind the requirement of a "judicial authority"
in Article 38(1) is unclear. No explanation of this requirement was
given in the Commission's report on its development of the Draft
Articles, but some conclusions can be drawn from the Commis-
sion's study. Among the remedies studied were habeas corpus,
amparo, and regular appeal; all require judicial proceedings to
challenge the legality of an arrest or detention. Accordingly, be-
cause three of the most important remedies studied provide for a
judicial authority, it is likely that the Commission developed Arti-
cle 38(1) as a summary of these remedies. Yet, it is not evident that
a judicial procedure is essential to the functions performed by these
remedies. An historical examination of the development of habeas
corpus and its broader derivative, amparo, indicates that the pur-
pose of these remedies could be achieved using a variety of proce-
85. See appendix, table 2, infra. Countries that agreed with Article 38(l) but objected
to other provisions irrelevant to this discussion are designated by "C" and "D."
86. See id.
87. For examples of this criticism, see U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 2, at 5-6 (1963)
(Finland); U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 10, at 7 (1964) (Romania).
88. See note 2 supra.
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dures8 9
The protection offered by habeas corpus, amparo, and regular
appeal is dependent upon the detained person's ability to challenge
the legality of his detention before an authority independent of the
prosecution and the police.90 The fundamental requirement is that
the authority reviewing the complaint be independent, but not nec-
essarilyjudicial in nature. 91 It seems, therefore, that another tribu-
nal having the same qualities of responsibility, independence, and
impartiality could protect the rights of the detainee and accomplish
the same objective as the other remedies.
Countries that lack remedies requiring judicial proceedings
submitted comments on Article 38(1) indicating that they have
remedies that accomplish the same function through different pro-
cedures. Hungary's comments detailed the procedures followed by
four of the five countries criticizing the Article 38(1) requirement of
a judicial authority92 - procedures that provide full and in many
cases more guarantees against arbitrary arrest and detention than
89. Historically, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus was to prevent royal power
from manufacturing offenses and detaining a person indefinitely without trial. Seegeneraly
I W. BAILEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES 2-6
(1913). The remedy was considered related to the Magna Charta which prohibited arrest
and imprisonment without due process of law. Regardless of its origins, the continued use of
habeas corpus brought extended recognition of the procedure as a speedy and effective rem-
edy for securing the freedom of the subject from illegal imprisonment. United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland- The Writ of Habeas Corpus, [1949] Y.B. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 229-30 (United Nations). Today, the essence of the procedure is to subject "arbi-
trary executive imprisonment to the check of scrutiny by independent judges guided by the
principles of the law of the land." 1d.
90. Id.
91. Support for this characterization is found in statements on human rights made by
the American Law Institute. In describing the procedural right of habeas corpus and its
requirement of a judicial reviewing authority, the Institute states that "whatever the charac-
ter of the tribunal may be, it is indispensable that the determination be 'judicial' in the sense
of the judicial tradition of responsibility, independence and impartiality." Committee of the
American Law Institute, Essential Human Rights, 243 ANNALS 21-22 (1946).
92. In Hungary, either the detained person or the procurator may challenge the legality
of his detention. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 36 (1963) (Hungary). Hungary further ex-
plained:
The Government . . . adheres to the principle that the detention shall be ordered,
or other related measures taken, only by an organ proceeding independently of the
administrative organs of the state, the local organs of state power, and the judicial
authorities. These powers belong to the procurator's office exercising general legal-
ity control and proceeding independently of the administrative and judicial author-
ities as well as of the local organs of state power.
1d. at 37 (Hungary). Similar to the remedies of habeas corpus, amparo, and regular appeal,
the procedures outlined by Hungary require a reviewing authority which is responsible, in-
dependent, and impartial. Id. at 36 (Hungary).
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1980], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss2/4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
those offered in the Draft Articles.93 Based on this Hungarian
description, one may conclude that other remedies meet the funda-
mental requirement of judicial review of a detainee's complaint.94
Hungarian-type remedies were discussed by the Commission
in its report of the Draft Articles. In analyzing these remedies, the
Commission described the procedures as follows:
In certain systems, complaints against wrongful custody are dealt
with by special supervisory authorities usually called
"procurators". The Procurator-General is appointed by the leg-
islative organ . . . . The laws of all the countries concerned
stress that the Procurator-General is independent of all other au-
thorities ....
' . . The procurator must release wrongfully detained per-
sons either ex officio or upon complaint by the person concerned
* . . Provisions concerning complaints to the procurators do
not exclude recourses to the courts . . . . Thus, it is provided
that appeals may be made to the courts against negative deci-
sions of the procurator .... 95
Hungary and the Commission's report agree that this procedure, as
well as judicial remedies, requires an independent, impartial, and
responsible reviewing authority. Because of this agreement, Article
38(1) could be modified to include procedures that do not techni-
cally fulfill the article's requirement for a judicial reviewing author-
ity.9 6
Finland, also a critic of the judicial requirement of Article
38(1), described another procedure that must be included if total
93. Id. at 37 (Hungary).
94. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE USSR (M. Bassiouni & V. Savitski eds.
1979) details protection of detained persons similar to that offered in Hungary. Here the
institution of Procurator-General is described as the office responsible for protecting the
rights of detained persons. See Savitski, Institutions for the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE USSR 19-26 (M. Bassiouni & V. Savitski
eds. 1979). The Soviet Constitution states that the Procurator's Office is independent of local
authorities. KOHCTITUCIYA (Constitution) art. 168 (Soviet Union), reprintedin XIV CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CONSTITUTIONS]. One of the fundamentals of criminal procedure is found in
Article 54, which states: "No one may be arrested except by a court decision or on the
warrant of a procurator." KOHCTITUCIYA (Constitution) art. 54 (Soviet Union). These pro-
visions, read together, support the Hungarian conclusion that such criminal procedures re-
quire a reviewing authority that is responsible, independent, and impartial. See note 92
supra.
95. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/Rev. 1, at 124-25 (1964).
96. It seems, therefore, that there is agreement in principle among the procedures of
habeas corpus, amparo, regular appeal, and administrative proceedings that are independent
of the prosecution and the police. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 2, at 5-6 (1963) (Finland).
Vol. 10
23
Maki: General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized By All Nations:
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
agreement upon Article 38(1) is to be reached. In discussing the
judicial safeguards of the freedom from arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion, Finland stated: "It should be noticed. . . that in some coun-
tries an administrative procedure can be resorted to, as well, for the
same purpose."97 Consequently, Article 38(1) should be modified
to include these administrative proceedings.
Modification of Article 38(l) to include the procedures dis-
cussed above produces the following two summarized principles:
2. Anyone who is arrested or detained shall be entitled to
initiate proceedings before an authority in order to challenge the
legality of his arrest or detention and obtain his release from that
authority without delay if it is unlawful.
3. The authority before which these proceedings take place
must be an impartial authority independent of the prosecution
and the police.
It is significant that none of the countries submitting comments
to the Draft Articles suggested that the result of the proceeding be
anything but the detainee's release, if the arrest or detention is un-
lawful. Many countries stated that their laws provide for compen-
sation to the detainee and criminal sanctions for those responsible
for the unlawful detention.98 There was not agreement regarding
the procedures and scope of these additional remedies; therefore,
they were not included in the summarized principles.
A final detail which met with universal acceptance was the
provision, found in both Article 38(1) and summarized principle 2,
that the detainee has the right to initiate proceedings to challenge
the legality of his detention. The Commission's report on the Draft
Articles summarizes this principle, noting that in all countries on
which material is available, complaints may be lodged by the per-
son deprived of his liberty, and sometimes also by an official acting
in the interest of the detainee.99
In countries using habeas corpus and amparo, a number of
other persons can also challenge the detention."' However, be-
97. Id. at 5. Finland mentioned that under its system both the Chancellor of Justice
and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the control of the judiciary and the administration
play an important role in preserving this freedom. Id. at 5-6. Again, these offices appear to
operate independently of the prosecution and police to fulfill the basic requirements of the
other remedies included in Article 38(1).
98. For the Soviet description of its own provision, see U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 3,
at 1-2 (1963). See also U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 33 (1963) (France); id. at 61 (Spain); id. at
67 (Ukrainian S.S.R.).
99. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826 Rev. 1, at 132-33 (1964).
100. Id.
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cause the summarized principles include only principles where
there was total agreement, only the narrowest scope of the right is
used; therefore, the initiation right was limited to the detainee.
C Development and Recognition of the Fourth Summarized
Principle
4. Anyone who is arrested or detained shall be entitled to
initiate proceedings within a relatively short time period as pre-
scribed by law.
This summarized principle is a modification of the time re-
quirement found in Article 38(1) of the Draft Articles, requiring
that proceedings challenging the legality of detention take place im-
mediately.'0 ' A time requirement was included in the Draft Arti-
cles, because the Commission wanted to emphasize the
characteristic of prompt determination found in the remedies of
habeas corpus, amparo, and regular appeal. °2 None of the coun-
tries submitting comments specifically objected to the requirement
of immediate proceedings. This is noteworthy, because other arti-
cles providing for time requirements generated severe criticism.
10 3
Although there were no specific objections to the Article 38(1)
time requirements, Romania's general proposal to redraft the arti-
cle indicates that the procedure did not receive total acceptance."
Romania's comments indicate it would only accept summarized
principle 4 if the time requirement were left to specific state legisla-
tion.' The general acceptance of Article 38(1) and the absence of
any specific objections by Romania or other countries indicate a
101. Id. at 216.
102. Id.
103. Article 10, for example, requires that an arrested person be brought before a judicial
authority within 24 hours. Id. at 208. Eighteen countries specifically objected to the 24-hour
time provision. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835, at 5 (1963) (Austria).
104. Romania did not specifically object to the time requirement of Article 38(1), yet it
proposed that it be redrafted as follows: "Any person who has been detained or who is liable
to detention shall be entitled, if he considers that he is being wrongfully detained or that his
detention has been wrongfully ordered, to apply to the ... authority with a request that the
wrongful detention be discontinued or prevented." U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 10, at 19
(1964).
Romania further suggested that any additional regulations clearly indicate "that each
state shall institute and specify its own regulations regarding the procedure of reviewing
detentions and the right of the detained person to complain, in keeping with its own legal
system .... Id.
105. This assumption is based upon Romania's comments, her proposal that the Draft
Article be redrafted to exclude specific time requirements, and her suggestion "that each
state ... institute ... its own regulations .. " Id.
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general consensus that the detainee's complaint proceedings should
take place within a relatively short time. Accordingly, it is reason-
able to expect total agreement with the fourth summarized- princi-
ple given above.
D. State Emergency Powers May Suspend the Summarized
Princoles
A caveat to the summarized principles can be stated as follows:
If a state faced with a national emergency decides that it is
appropriate, it may put aside the usual regulations regarding ar-
rest and detention, but only to the extent found necessary by that
state. In such situations, the emergency must be officially pro-
claimed in accordance with law and the extraordinary authority
which is to exercise emergency powers must be regulated by
law. 06
This caveat was derived by summarizing Draft Articles 34 through
37.107 These articles give a state limited rights to suspend regular
106. See. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 8, at 23 (1963) (Norway).
107. The Draft provisions dealing with this exception are:
IV. Arrest and Detention Under Emergency Powers
Article 34
When an emergency which threatens the life of the nation exists and has been
officially proclaimed and it becomes necessary to provide for powers of arrest and
detention, such powers shall be granted only for the duration of the emergency and
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The conditions
under which and the procedures according to which these powers may be exercised
must clearly be defined by law.
Article 35
1. Arrest and detention under emergency powers shall take place only upon
written order from the competent authority indicating the reasons for the order and
the facts in support thereof.
2. A copy of the order shall be given to the person at the time of his arrest
and he shall be informed at the same time of his right to make a representation
against the order and to have legal counsel.
Article 36
1. The order of detention shall be submitted within twenty-four hours of the
arrest to a competent court or other body established by law at least half of whose
members are drawn from the judiciary for the purpose of deciding whether or not
there is sufficient cause for the detention. The reviewing authority shall hear the
detained person and his counsel. It shall be furnished with such information by
detaining authorities or other persons as it may require.
2. If the reviewing authority decides that there is sufficient cause for the de-
tention, it may be continued subject to periodic examination by the reviewing au-
thority.
3. If the reviewing authority decides that the detention is not justified, the
order shall be revoked and the detained person released forthwith.
4. The reviewing authority shall inform the detained person of all his rights
and shall inquire into the treatment accorded to him in custody.
Article 37
Any person who has been detained under the special powers shall have the
right even after the termination of the emergency to obtain compensation from
public funds for any material or moral damages which he may have suffered on
26
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arrest and detention procedures.'08 The articles were acceptable to
most countries submitting comments. Some countries stated that
although their municipal laws contained no provisions for emer-
gency powers, the principles were acceptable.0 9 Article 34, which
states the general principle of the caveat, was more acceptable to
the commenting countries than were other articles that addressed
the caveat more specifically. Many countries, including Mexico
and Brazil, enumerated provisions in their constitutions that dupli-
cated Article 34 provisions." 0 In contrast to the general acceptance
of Article 34, several countries found other articles describing de-
tailed emergency powers to be objectionable."' Norway's com-
ments provide a solution to these objections:
It is doubtful whether general agreement can be obtained regard-
ing detailed rules to come into effect under such emergency con-
ditions described in this Division. A declaration of principle
should in this connection probably be restricted to a general rule
stipulating that usual regulations regarding arrest and detention
may under such conditions be put aside to the extent found nec-
essary, and that the extraordinary authority which is to exercise
emergency powers must be regulated by law.' 12
The Netherlands felt these articles were insufficiently flexible
to deal with the different kinds of situations arising in a national
emergency. "3 Norway's suggestions provide the solution to this in-
flexibility - they lack the detail objectionable to the Netherlands.
Norway's solution provides that state law prescribe the details in
these matters as well as the extent and scope of the measures to be
account of any abuse of their powers by the authorities detaining him or any excess
or unreasonable exercise thereof.
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/Rev. 1, at 215-16 (1964).
108. Also included in the Draft Articles were detailed procedures to be followed upon
such suspension. See generally id.
109. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 1, at 13 (1963) (Denmark).
110. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 2, at 35 (1963) (Mexico); U.N. Doc. E/CN.
4/835/Add. 8, at 3 (1963) (Brazil).
11. The Federal Republic of Germany, while fully supporting Article 34, stated: "It
seems doubtful ... whether it would in fact always be possible to keep within the time-limit
of twenty-four hours provided for in article 36, .... " U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 6, at 13
(1963). Germany's suggestion that the time limit be replaced by a more flexible arrangement
was also found in the comments by Israel. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 7, at 2, 7 (1963)
(Israel).
112. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 8, at 23 (1963) (Norway).
113. This preference of principle over detail was shared by the Netherlands, which, in
commenting on Articles 34 through 37, stated: "One gets the impression that these articles
do not take due account of the kind of situations that can arise in a national emergency."
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 5, at 5 (1963). See generally CONSTITuCION art. 29 (Mexico);
CONSTITUICAo arts. 155-59 (Brazil).
Vol. 10
27
Maki: General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized By All Nations:
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
taken." l4 Under these provisions, the state can assess the emer-
gency at the time it occurs and prescribe the measures to be taken.
Accordingly, these provisions allow the state to take "due account"
of the different types of emergency situations, as suggested by the
Netherlands." 5
Surprisingly, some of the general criticism of the emergency
power articles was based not on their failure to account for state
interests, but on their failure to fully protect individual rights under
such circumstances."l 6 The reservations of many countries indicate
that their own municipal laws went further in the protection of the
detainee's rights than did the Draft Articles."
t7
These laws, although favoring police investigations, are not
without limitations; most regulations have specific limitations on
police action, which are aimed at preventing arbitrary activity.
1
8
There can be abuse of the rights of an individual under such cir-
cumstances, but serious national disturbances have often been the
motivation for enacting such legislation.' 9 Furthermore, states like
South Africa, which extensively utilize their emergency powers,
have still seen fit to limit police powers by specific provisions for
detention. 120 In other words, the emergency laws are not so broad
114. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 8, at 23 (1963) (Norway).
115. Following these considerations, the caveat to this discussion is limited to a general-
ized statement of Article 34 which had been suggested by Norway. Although this is not
another proposed principle on which all nations agree, some general statement should be
made as to the exception many states recognize in regard to arrest and detention rights.
116. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/835/Add. 3, at 5 (1963) (Soviet Union); U.N. Doc. E/CN.
4/835/Add. 8, at 7 (1963) (Byelorussia).
117. It should be noted that such procedures are often used by states in times of civil
unrest. A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 249-50 (1973). In South Africa, for example,
civil unrest prompted some changes in the rights of detained persons. The South African
courts had historically been praised for their vigilant protection of human rights through the
use of remedies such as habeas corpus. Since 1963, however, the judiciary has favorably
interpreted statutes suspending habeas corpus under the state's emergency powers. These
statutes and decisions drastically curtail the rights of the individual and strongly favor the
security police. The motivation for this shift in policy was not the arbitrary preference of
lawmakers and judges; rather, episodes of sabotage led to the enactment of these special
security laws giving police the power to detain suspects incommunicado for interrogation. Id.
118. One such law allows police to detain for 90 days persons nspected of having infor-
mation about the commission of security offenses. Retention beyond that period can be justi-
fied only by producing fresh information supporting the original grounds or new grounds for
detention. Id. Therefore, this law cannot be used as a basis for arbitrary detention; the
specific limitations requiring the production of new evidence would check arbitrary police
action.
119. See generally id at 240-50. Sachs discusses how acts of terrorism lead to the curtail-
ment of arrest and detention rights.
120. See note 118 supra.
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as to make any arbitrary police acts lawful, even in regard to per-
sons suspected of security offenses.
VII. FURTHER TESTING OF THE PRINCIPLES
A. Implied Acceptance of the Summarized Principles by the
Examination of "Statements Made by States" to the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights
In August 1950, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council decided that additional information should be compiled in
the Secretary General's annual publication of the Yearbook on
Human Rights. ' This information was to include national devel-
opments concerning the application and evolution of one of the
rights, or a group of closely related rights, set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.'22 The 1959 Yearbook on Human
Rights includes statements regarding the application and evolution
of the right set forth in Article 9 of the Declaration: no one shall be
subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.
123
These statements proved to be a useful source of information
on municipal laws. Each country described its own state law and
practice concerning arrest and detention. 124 Furthermore, most of
the countries submitting comments compared their procedures to
those used in other systems. Accordingly, this information offers an
invaluable tool for the comparative analysis of municipal proce-
dures.
In contrast to the Draft Articles, these statements are directed
at the much broader declaration that everyone has the right to be
free from arbitrary arrest and detention. These statements are even
more varied in style and content than the Draft Articles comments.
Regardless of the variety of methods countries employed to de-
scribe their municipal law, agreement among countries was evi-
121. U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/826/Rev. 1, at 1-3 (1964).
122. Id. at 1.
123. 11 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 6) 4-5, U.N. Doc. E/2731 (1955); see generally Freedom
from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, [1959] Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FIRST SUPPLE-
MENTARY VOLUME (United Nations) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN RIGHTS].
124. The Dominican Republic safeguards individual liberty in its Habeas Corpus Act.
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 82-86. The Byelorussian Code of Criminal Procedure at
Article 5 guarantees: "No person may be deprived of liberty and placed in custody except in
the cases specified by statute and in accordance with the statutory procedure." Id. at 32.
Belgium goes one step further and provides in Article 7 of the Belgian constitution that "[tihe
findings are subject to appeal to the arraignment chamber . I..." 1d. at 21.
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dent.'25 Many of the rights and remedies emphasized are the same
rights and remedies included in the summarized principles. There-
fore, where such rights and remedies are found, it can be implied
that the countries recognizing these rights and remedies also accept
the summarized principles.
Reviewing the statements, all of the countries examined im-
pliedly accepted summarized principle 1 by indicating similar prin-
ciples in their own municipal systems.' 26 In addition, of the
twenty-three countries examined, seventeen impliedly agreed with
the summarized principles 2 through 4; the other countries failed to
give sufficient information on which to base a comparison.1
27
The synopsis of these statements is illustrated in tables I and II
of the appendix. It supports the assertion that the summarized
principles are general principles of law recognized by all nations.
B. Acceptance of the Summarized Principles Implied by the
Existence of Similar Rights and Remedies in "'Municipal
Constitutions"
The last source of municipal law examined in searching for
evidence of agreement with the summarized principles was munici-
pal constitutions. 2 8 If a nation grants constitutional rights and
remedies similar to the summarized principles, it should accept the
summarized principles.
Unlike the municipal law sources previously studied, the con-
stitutions lacked accompanying explanations of the system; they
merely state the various rights and remedies for which they pro-
vide. 29 Thus, the use of constitutions presents strong possibilities
of error in interpreting foreign legal systems.130
125. For indication of agreement, see appendix infra.
126. See, e.g., note 124 supra.
127. An example of insufficient information is found in the statement by Greece. The
Greek government agreed with the principle that an individual has the right to be free from
arbitrary arrest and detention. Yet, Greece did not detail the procedures used to safeguard
this right in its constitution. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 112-17.
128. See generally CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 94, vols. I-XV.
129. In comparing national constitutions, patterns were noticed. The Honduras constitu-
tion, which recognizes the remedy of habeas corpus and amparo to safeguard freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention, exemplifies many Central and South American constitutions.
CONSTITUCI6N art. 58 (Honduras), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 94, vol. VI.
Likewise, Sierra Leone's constitution which recognizes the right to "automatic review," is
similar to the constitutions of many African nations. SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 2, § 7, re-
printed in id., vol. XII. Nepal, reflecting common law traditions, has adopted the remedy of
habeas corpus. NEPAL CONST. art. 1I, reprinted in id., vol. X.
130. To combat such errors, comparisons were drawn only when the rights and remedies
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In examining the constitutions for provisions similar to the
summarized principles, it is found that, like the statements and
comments previously examined, the constitutions vary in form and
substance. In some constitutions, a right summarized in the princi-
ples is specifically declared in the constitution. 3' In other constitu-
tions, the declaration of adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights implies agreement with the summarized princi-
ples.' 32 There are, however, constitutions like Lebanon's that enu-
merate rights and remedies in such vague terms that there is
insufficient information on which to base any comparison.
33
Nearly all constitutions specifically provide for the right to
complain to a government instrumentality regarding violations of
the law by public officials. It is unclear in some instances whether
this right of complaint includes the right to complain to a judicial
authority. If the judiciary is an instrumentality of the state (a prob-
able interpretation), then there is agreement between this right of
complaint and summarized principles 2 and 3, based on the re-
quirement of summarized principle 3 that review of arbitrary de-
tention be made by an independent authority. If, under these
constitutional remedies, review of the complaint can be done by the
judiciary, the reviewing authority is independent.
All constitutions providing for this remedy of complaint spe-
cifically mention that the judiciary is an independent authority. 
134
Accordingly, if these remedies of complaint include judicial review,
there is agreement between these remedies and summarized princi-
ples 2 and 3. Because there is some question in regard to these
found in constitutions were clearly stated. Where it was found that the constitutional provi-
sions were too vague to accurately describe a system's procedures regarding arrest and deten-
tion, no comparison was drawn. Where it was felt that only some comparison would
accurately be drawn, any assumptions used in this study were clearly stated. A further safe-
guard against such errors was to limit the use of constitutions to situations where no state-
ments or comments by the countries themselves were available. Where such other sources
were available, they were used as more accurate descriptions of municipal law.
131. See note 129 supra.
132. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
133. Article 8 of the Lebanese constitution reads simply: "Personal freedom shall be
guaranteed and protected. No person may be arrested or kept in custody except in accord-
ance with the law. No offense may be established or penalty imposed except in accordance
with the law." LEBANON CONST. art. 8, reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 94, vol. VIII.
134. See, e.g., VERFASSUNG art. 96 (East Germany), reprinted in id., vol. V; KONSTITUT-
SIIA (Constitution) art. 129 (Bulgaria), reprinted in id., vol. II; KUSHTETUI (Constitution) art.
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proceedings, implied agreement with the principles must be condi-
tioned on this interpretation of the right of complaint.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article has set forth evidence supporting the assertion that
general principles of law recognized by all nations are an important
source of international law which can be realistically identified and
defined. Based on the traditional view that municipal law is one
source of general principles of law, this study has shown that by
examining and comparing the municipal laws of various countries
some common denominators among municipal systems might well
be among those general principles of law recognized by all nations.
If such general principles of law can be defined, it follows that they
can be enforceable as part of international as well as domestic law.
Such possibilities are particularly attractive in the area of
human rights law where a variety of claims and declarations make
international human rights an area of extreme uncertainty. The
identification of some general principles of human rights law recog-
nized by all nations could provide a starting point for a more realis-
tic development of international human rights.
The scope of this article focuses on some limited descriptions
of municipal law. For the most part, these sources are statements
made by individual countries describing their own legal systems;
therefore, some of the pitfalls of interpreting foreign laws are
avoided. Yet, even with these imposed limitations, a surprising
amount of agreement is found between a wide variety of legal sys-
tems. This indicates that there exist common denominators among
legal systems which can be considered general principles of law rec-
ognized by all nations. It is hoped the approach to finding such
principles used in this study will be employed in the future to fur-
ther the development and codification of international law.
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APPENDIX
I. TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF ACCEPTANCE OF
SUMMARIZED PRINCIPLES 1 THROUGH 4: EXPLANATION
OF TABLES I AND II
The four summarized principles' were derived from the Draft
Articles. Therefore, it is assumed that a country accepting a specific
Draft Article would also accept the summarized principle(s) de-
rived therefrom. The following two tables (I & II) demonstrate that
there would be total acceptance of the summarized principles by
countries that commented on the Draft Articles. To diagram this
agreement, the summarized principles are divided into two tables.
Table I designates the acceptance of summarized principle 1.
This principle embodies the right upon which the remedies of the
other summarized sprinciples are based. Therefore, if a country
does not accept this principle, it is doubtful it will accept the other
three; further investigation of such a country is therefore consid-
ered useless.
Table II designates the acceptance of summarized principles 2
through 4. These principles are combined, because all of the reme-
dies in the preparation of the Draft Articles embody these three
principles in a single remedy. Similarly, it is assumed that other
municipal systems would also combine these principles into a single
remedy. Therefore, any comparison of these other remedies to the
principles is facilitated.
A. Express Acceptance of Principles 1 through 4
Those countries which expressly accept (by assumption) either
summarized principle 1 or summarized principles 2 through 4 use
one of various methods to designate their acceptance. In the first
column of Tables I and II, a capital letter is used to indicate the
method of express acceptance used by the respective country:
A - Specific acceptance of all the Draft Articles.
B - Specific acceptance of the pertinent (derived) Draft
Article(s).
C - Specific acceptance of the pertinent Draft Article(s),
with criticism directed at Draft Articles irrelevant to
the present discussion.
1. Summarized principle I is found in the text, supra, at 286; summarized principles 2
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D - General acceptance of the Draft Articles, with criti-
cism directed at Draft Articles irrelevant to the pres-
ent discussion.
Where there was specific disagreement with a Draft Article
pertinent to the summarized principle(s), the principle(s) was
(were) modified to be acceptable to the objecting country:
E - Specific disagreement with a Draft Article; the sum-
marized principle(s) derived therefrom reconciles the
disagreement.
B. Implied Acceptance." Municoal Law
1. Table I. Acceptance of summary principle 1, implied by
the municipal law of a country, is indicated in the second column.
These entries are based on statements by countries to the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights. The statements are con-
sidered to be a source of information inferior to the more specific
Draft Articles comments, and were only consulted when Draft Arti-
cles comments were unavailable. The nature of the law and the
source of the information are designated by either (1) or (2):
(1) The specific right stated in the summary principle has
been described by the country as one of its own consti-
tutional rights.
(2) The specific right stated in the summary principle has
been described by the country as one recognized by its
municipal law.
2. Table II. Acceptance of summary principles 2 through 4,
implied by the municipal law of a country, is also indicated in the
second column. The nature of the law and the source of the infor-
mation are indicated by the following:
(1) The country, in an earlier statement, described a mu-
nicipal remedy included in the summarized principles.
(2) The country referred to an earlier statement made to
the Commission, which described a municipal remedy
included in the summarized principles.
(3) The country, while not specifically describing the rights
of the detainee under its system, has stated that its laws
follow the traditional English system, which system in-
cludes the procedure of habeas corpus, included in the
summarized principles.
(4) The country has not detailed the detainee's rights
under its system, but the vague description given of the
rights to automatic review (included in the summarized
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principles) seems to fulfill the requirements of the sum-
marized principles. This implication is weaker than
the three above.
(5) The country has not sufficiently detailed the rights of a
detainee under its system necessary for any comparison
to the summarized principles.
C Implied Acceptance." Constitutional Provisions
1. Table I. Acceptance of summary principle 1, implied by
the provisions of a country's constitution, is indicated in the third
column. The lower case letters in parentheses signify the following:
(a) The specific right stated in the summary principle was de-
clared in the country's constitution.
(b) The constitution declares adherence to the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, which specifically recognizes the
principles stated in summarized principle 1.
(c) The constitution declares rights sufficiently similar to those
found in summarized principle 1 to infer agreement. This is
weaker than the implication in (a).
(d) There is insufficient information to infer agreement: The
constitution does not enumerate human rights.
(e) There is insufficient information to infer agreement: The
constitution is unavailable.
These letters are followed by numerals in parentheses, which
indicate the article(s) of the country's constitution that provides the
basis for implication.
2. Table II. Acceptance of summary principles 2 through 4,
implied by the provisions of a country's constitution, is also indi-
cated in the third column. The first set of parentheses is interpreted
according to the following:
(1) The constitution provides for remedies which are specifi-
cally included in the summarized principles:
(1 a) Habeas Corpus
(lb) Regular Appeal
(lc) Complaint with Independent Supervision
(ld) Amparo
(2) The constitution provides for remedies which appear to be
sufficiently similar to the remedies included in the summa-
rized principles:
(2a) Similar to Habeas Corpus
(2b) Similar to Regular Appeal
(2c) Similar to Complaint with Independent Supervision
This is weaker than the implication of (1) above.
Vol. 10
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(3) The constitution specifically recognizes the right to be free
from arbitrary arrest and detention, and generally provides
for the right to complain to any government instrumentality
regarding violations of the law by public officials.
(4) The constitution specifically recognizes the right to be free
from arbitrary arrest and detention and designates the judi-
ciary as the guardian of this and other constitutional rights.
In addition, the constitution declares adherence to the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.
(4a) The constitution specifically recognizes the right to be
free from arbitrary arrest and detention and also ad-
heres to the Universal Declaration (but no designa-
tion of judicial guardian).
(4b) The constitution only mentions these principles by
implication through its declared adherence to the
Universal Declaration.
(5) The constitution enumerates rights and remedies in such
vague terms that there is insufficient information on which
to base any comparison.
(6) The constitution does not enumerate human rights at all;
therefore, information is insufficient for any comparison.
(7) The constitution is unavailable for study; no comparison
can be made.
The second set of parentheses contains the article(s) of the constitu-
tion that provides the basis for the implication.
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(4)(13, 101) & (4)(preamble)
(4)(81, 83) & (4)(preamble
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